Island hopping: the voyages of canadian deep-sea mailing vessels to the West Indies, 1863-1890

              DEEP-SEA SAILING VESSELS TO THE WEST INDIES,
GERALD PANTING
LEWIS R. FISCHER'
Maritime History Group
Memorial University of Newfoundland
The West Indies have been a major trading area since the sixteenth
century. The archipelago, stretching from the Baharnas in the north to Tri-m
nidad and Tobago in the south, was an intense battleground for more than
two centuries in the European competition for colonies and trade. The prize E
was largely a rich staple -sugar- and hence the generic term «sugar is- O
n
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l'ulu3u UCCUllIC 3 y l l u l l y l l l u 3 WlLll LILC W C3L LllUlC3. O
E Settlers in British North America had long been involved in trade with E
2
the area. The West Indies, with their predominantly plantation-style eco- E
nomies dependent on slave labour, were an important destination for the
fish caught off the shores of Newfoundland and Nova Scotial. This trade, 3
broadened to include produce from the forests of New Brunswick and the -
0m
farms of Prince Edward Island, continued to be one of the most important E
avenues of commerce for British North Americans throughout the first half O
of the nineteenth century2. n
E But by mid-century the West Indies were entering a period of change a
and, in many instances, relative decline. The Ten Years' War in Cuba n
n (1868-78) would ravage the eastern Cuban sugar industry; the long-term
decline in the Jarnaican economy showed few signs of abating; and islands 3
O such as Barbados, Antigua, Trinidad, Tobago, Grenada, St. Vicent and St.
Lucia, while relatively prosperous, were facing a half-century of market dis-
1. On the Newfoundland fishery see, for example, C. Grant Head, Eighteenth Century
Newfoundland A Geographer's Perspective (Toronto 1976). The Nova Scotia fish trade is
analyzed in Lewis R. Fischer, «The Corner of the Triangle: Trade and Society in Eighteenth
Century Halifam, in Walter Minchinton and Janina Konczacki (eds.), Eighteenth C e n t q
Port Cities (forthcoming) .
2. The New Brunswick trade is cogently analyzed in Graeme Wynn, Timber Colony: An
Hictoricd Geogr4bhy qf Early Nineteenth C8ntu.y NPW B.mnstoi~.h (Toronto 1981). Phce
Edward Island involvement is discussed at length in Lewis R. Fischer, EnterpGe in a Mantime
Setting: The Sbipping Industry of Phce EdwardI~land, 1787-1914 (forthcoming, St. John's,
1983). Chapter V.
posal of cargoes. In the new industry of the later nineteenth century, re-venues
would be gleaned chiefly from sihp operations4.
These simultaneous alterations in both the West Indian economy and
the Canadian merchant marine would have profound effects upon the
manner in which Canadian vessels were employed in the West Indies. In-creasingly,
the principal links between West Indian exports and the Cana-dian
economy was a vessel owned and registered in a Canadian port. This
paper will attempt to describe the patterns of deployment of Canadian sail-ing
vessels in the West Indies and to offer some tentative explanations for
the phenomena observed.
Before beginning the analysis, however, a brief comment on sources
may be useful. The principal source for data on Canadian vessels is a re-markable
set of documents known somewhat prosaicaly as the ~Agreements
and Accounts of Crew. These wrew lists*, comprising some four and one
half miles of shelf space for the period 1863- 19 13, are particularly valuable
for the maritime historian. Basically, they are the actual agreements be-tween
the master and crew of an ocean-going vessel. The Maritime History
Group at Memorial University of Newfoundland possesses about eighty
percent of these agreements for the above period5.
The crew lists can be used for a varitey of purposes. In this paper, how-ever,
we will concentrate upon only a few. In particular, we will use these
documents to trace voyage patterns. This is possible because under British
maritime law, masters were required to deposit their agreements with either
the British consul or the local shipping master within forty-eight hours of
arrival in foreing ports. The a r d e s were then stamped and the dates of
arrival and departure noted. Hence, they provide a much more accurate
method of actually following a vessel from pon to pon than was heretofore
possible. It should be noted, though, that the crew lists give no information
4. This process is described in Eric W. Sager, Lewis R. Fischer and Rosemary Ommer,
«Landward and Seaward Opponunities in Canada's Age of Saib, in Lewis R. Fischer and Eric
W. Sager (eds.), Merchant ShipDing and Economic Devekbment in Atlantic Cm& @t.
John's 1982), 7-31.
5 . Keith Matthews, aCrew Lists, Agreements, and Official Logs of the British Empire,
1863-1913,. Business History, XVI (January 1974), 78-80. The MHG is dso now in possession
of the Crew Lists for the 1914-1939 period.
about cargoes; students interested in a micro-analysis of commodities carri-ed
on specific voyages must resort to alternative sources6.
A large number of the Canadian crew lists have been coded and ana-lyzed
using computers as part of the Atlantic Canada Shipping Project.
This six-year effort to comprehend the eastern Canadian industry between
1820 and 1914 has been discussed at length elsewhere, and those interested
in the project and its data files can consult the relevant literature'. A subset
of these larger data files, comprising al1 voyages with one or more pnrts of
cal1 in the West Indies, forms the backbone of the following analysis8.
What were the patterns of Canadian vessels in the West Indian trade?
To answer this question, we can begin by analyzing the computer fiie deriv-
6. For a discussion of alternative sources, see Lewis R. Fischer and Eric W. Sager, «An
Approach to the Quantitative Analysis of British Shipping Records), Business History, XXII,
No. 2 Uuly 1980). 135-151; Lewis R. Fischer, rShipping and the Baltic Wood Trades. 1863-
1 9 0 8~(p aper presented to the Eighth International Economic History Congress, Budapest,
Hungary, August 1982).
7. On rhe technical side of the project, see David Alexander, «Objectives and Methodolo-gies
of the Atlantic Canada Shipping Projeca, The Great Circle: The Journalofthe Australian
Assoczation for Maritme Histoq, 1, No. 2 (October 1979). 36-42; Fischer and Sager, aAn
Approach to the Quantitative Anaiysi~>L;e wis R. Fischer and Rosemary E. Ommer, rClio and
the Machine: Computers and Quantitative Methodology in the Study of Maritime Historp, in
Glyn Williams and Sarah Paimer (eds.), Chartedand Uncharted Waters: The Study of Bntish
Mantime Hirtory (forthcoming, Greenwich, England 1982). The results of the project have
been published widely, but for some of the major conclusiones, see Keith Matthews and Ge-raid
Panting (eds.), Ships andShipbuilding in the Nortb Atlantic Region (St. John's 1978);
Lewis R. Fischer and Eric W. Sager (eds.). The Enterpnjing Cazadians: Entrepreneurs and
Economic Deveiopment in Eastern Canada, 1820-1914, (St. John's 1979); David Alexander
and Rosemary E. Ommer (eds.), Volumes Not Values: Canadian Sailing Ships and World
Trades (St. John's 1979); Rcsemary E. Ommer and Gerald Panting (eds.), Working
n-1- Who Got Te? (S:. j0h.q'~ 1981); Lewis R. Fischer 2nd Frie \Y. Sager (eds.), Me?-
chant Shzpping and Economic Development in Atlantic Canada (St. John's 1982); Lewis
P. Fischer and Keith Matthews (eds.), Chunge and Adaptation in Mantime Hrrtoq;
The National Fleets of the North Atlantic Rim, 1820-1914 (forthcoming, St. John's
1983); Eric W. Sager and Lewis R. Fischer, «Patterns of Investment in the Shipping Industries
of Atlantic Canada, 1820-190b, Acadiensis, IX, No. 1 (Autumn 1979). 19-43; Eric W. Sager
and Lewis R. Fischer, «Atlantic Canada and the Age of Sail Revisited~C, anadian HistonCd Re-uiew,
LXIII; No. 2 oune 1982). 125-150.
8. Only those voyages beginning in the period 1863-1890 were used in the analysis. The
decline of the Canadian fleet becarne so pronunced after that date that trends and patterns
were no longer discernable.
ed from al1 voyages made by vessels registered in Saint John, New Bruns-wick,
and Halifax, Windsor and Yarmouth, Nova Scotia. Of the more
than 18,000 voyages completed by vessels registered in these ports, 2010,
or just under eleven percent, touched on the West Indies (see Table 1).
As the table indicates, not al1 of the eastern Canadian ports were equally
represented in trade to the Caribbean islands. This connection was relati-vely
less important for vessels from Yarmouth or Windsor than for those
from Halifax or Saint John. Almost three of every five voyages were un-dertaken
by craft registered in Saint John, but since the fleet registered
in that New Bmnswick port was so large, the West Indian component of her
trade was slightly less important than for Halifaxy. But even though about
one voyage in seven by Halifax-registered vessels called in the Caribbean,
this proportion was less than might be inferred from the literature on Hali-fax
tradelo Ohvio~~rltyh,e WPSII ndies iccilpiec! an i~pe - r tmnt khe in :he
trading patterns of Canadian vessels.
We know the West Indies were important trading entrepots in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. But did the tropical islands re-tain
their allure after 1860? The answer, as revealed in Figure 1. would
appear to be mixed. Voyages to the West Indies were quite important in -
0
m
the 1860s and early 1870s, after which a long-term decline set in. WhiIe the E
1870s were the single most important decade, and more than ninety per- o
cent of al1 voyages occurred prior to 1880, most years after 1870 witnessed a n
E
a
9. See Lewis R. Fischer, «The Great Mudhole Fleet: The Voyages and Productivity of the
Sailing Vessels of Saint John, 1863-1912~i.n Alexander and Omrner (eds.), Volumes Not Va-hes,
117-155.
10. See, for example, David Sutherland. «HaIifax Merchants and the Pursuit of Develop-ment,
1783-1850», Canadian Historzcal Review, LIX, No. 1 (March 1978), 1- 17; Sutherland,
~ T h Pee rsonnel and Policies of the Haiifax Board of Trade, 1890-1914,. in Fischer and Sager
(eds.), Tbe Enterpnsing Canadian~2, 03-229. The best current ovewiew of Haiifax shipping in
this period is Eric W. Sager, «Sources of Productivi~C hange in the Halifax Qean F!ee~, !g/;?-
190(hP, in Alexander and Ommer (eds.), Volumes Not Vahes, 93-1 15.
11. When the Maritime Histocy Group acquired the Crew Lists from the Public Records
Office, it was agreed that a sample would be retained in England for research purposes.
Without resoning to any sophisticated sampling process, it was agreed that voyages terminat-ing
in years ending in ~ 5 (s18 65, 1875, 1885, etc.) would rernain in England. Some of rhese
docurnents, however, inadvertently were transferred to Newfoundland. As well, vessels start-ing
in years ending in «5* but concluding in the next year were pan of the holdings trans-ferred.
Thus, we possess a sample of the agreernents for those years, altho~ghit is impossible
to determine the precise percentage. For this reason, data for the middle year in each decade
should be interpreted with cate.
Table 1
Voyages to the West Indies by Vassels Registred in Selected Canadian Ports, 1863-1890
Port of N.0 Voyages % of WI WI Voyages as % of
Registry to WI Voyages Al1 Voyages
Saint John 1167 58.0% 13%
Yarmouth 308 15.3% 7%
Windsor 286 14.3% 3%
Halifax 249 12.4% 14%
Total 2010 100.0% 11%
Source: MHü, ((Agreements and Accounts of Crew)), 1863-1890 (hereafter referred to as West lndies Data File).
decline in the number of voyagesl2. We will explore this phenomenon later
in the paper.
The West Indian trades historically had been staple-based: timber and
fish were shipped from Canada, while sugar, cocoa, coffee and tobacco
comprised the bulk of the exports. Nevertheless, Canadians used principal-ly
medium-sized vessels in the trade (see Table 2). The favoured carrying ca-pacity
was the 250-499 ton class, and more than sixty percent of al1 voyages
were undertaken in vessels of less than five hundred tons burthen. This re-flects
not only the nature of the production function for the staple exports
but also the relatively primitive port facilities in the region. This latter cons-traint
was especially important: many ports in the islands were hazardous to m
navigation, shallow, or totally lacking in facilities for loading and unload- E
ing cargoesl3. O
To which ports did Canadian vessels trade? Table 3 lists the ten most n-- m
important ports in the islands, ranked both by number and tonnage of en- O
E
trances. Five of the ten were located in Cuba, with Havana and Matanzas E
2
E
ranking far above the other ports in importance. Of interest as well is the -
wide divergence in mean tonnage entering. Clearly, Havana, St. Thomas 3
and Port of Spain, al1 of which accommodated vessels of more than five - -
0
hundred tons on average, appear different. On the other hand, ports such m
E
as Kingston, Martinique, Cardenas and Cienfuegos were frequented by O
much smaller vessels. ng
The importance of Cuban ports is further illustrated by Table 4 , which -E
examines entrances by island. Over fifty-seven percent of al1 entrances into a
2
West Indian ports (N = 1598) were into harbours in Cuba. Barbados and n
n
St. Thomas (Virgin Islands) were the only other islands to account for even
ten percent of entrances. No other island, even the long-time entrepot of 3
O
Jamaica, comprised as much as four percent of regional entrances.
The predorninance of Cuba thus becomes evident. Indeed, a correla-tion
of first differences between changes in the number of entrances into
12. This impressionistic pattern is confirrned by calculating growth rates using a linear
regression model of the form Log Y = a + bt. The following equations are obtained:
1863-70: y = 1.897 + 0.1323, growth rate = 14.2% per annurn
1870-79: y = 1.858 - 0.0572, growth rate = -12.3% per annum
1880-89: y = 1.013 - 0.1682, growthrate = -8.1% per annum
3 Good cürirernporary descriptions of West Indian ports may be found in G.D. Urqu-han
(comp.), Dzles ami Charges on Shipping in Foreign Ports: A Mand of Refereme (Lon-don
1888).
Cum. %
co Figure 1 u
O3 200
180
160
140
1 LO
1 O0
80
60
West Indian Voytzges, 1863-1890"
Period N %
1863-69 645 32.1
1870-79 1178 58.6
\ 1880-89 187 9.3
\
\
\
I
/
"1
I
O 1863 1865 1870 1875 \ 1880 ' A \--
1885 1890
Note: Dotted lines indicate the figures for years ending in ((5)). For an explanation of this problem, see footnote 11.
Source: West Indies Data File.
Table 2
West Indian Voyages by Tonnage Class
Tonnage Class N.o Voyages %
Under 250 344 17.1
250- 499 894 44.5
500- 999 603 30.0
1 000- 1499 152 7.6
1500f 17 0.8
Source: West Indies Data File.
Table 3
Port
Havana
Mantanzas
St. Thomas
Cardenas
Cienfuegos
Bridgetown
Santiago
Martinique
Port of Spain
Kingston
Principal Ports of Call, 1863-1890
N.Q N.o
Entrances Rank ñonnage Rank
Source: West Indies Data File.
-
X
Tonnage
Table 4
Principal Ports of Cal1 by Island
Island
Cuba
Barbados
St. Thomas
Jamaica
Trinidad
Puerto Rico
Bahamas
Martinique
Bermuda
Haiti
Dominican Republic
Antigua
Guadeloupe
Curacao
St. Lucia
Remainder
Source: West Indies Data File.
% of Entrances
Cuban ports and changes in entrances into ports in the entire region yields a
value of + .87 up to 1879 and + .63 thereafter. This suggests that as much
as seventy-six percent of the variance in regional entrances in the egolden
age» i a y be explained by the attractions of Cuba14. Cleprly, any attempt to
understand the patterns of shipping in the Caribbean must begin with the
island of Cuba.
The nineteenth century was a period of intense change for the Cuban
economy. At the beginning of the century, tobacco, coffee and sugar were
of almost equal irnportance to the export trades. But for a variety of com-p!
ex RZISOES, the Napo!eonic Wars !eft the tohacco indiistry prostrrrte1> Si-milarly,
a prolonged period of price depression decimated the coffee indus-try
by mid-centuryl6. Henceforth, sugar was « kinp on the island.
The rise of the sugar industry in nineteenth century Cuba was tmly
phenomenal. As late as 1815 total production stood at about 42,000 tons
annually, about half the Jamaican output. But a period of intense growth
ensued. By 1862 production reached 500,000 tons per year, and average an-nual
output in the 1890s exceeded 950,000 tons per annum. At the end of
the century Cuba had for al1 practica1 purposes become aone-crop economy17.
This shift in the economic structure was accompained by profound
changes in the pattern of trade. In 1840, Europe was by far the most im-portant
market for Cuban exports, but by 1860, as Cuba moved closer to a
dependence upon only a single commodity, the United States absorbed
sixty-two percenty of Cuba's sugar exportsl8. In some years in the early
1890s, as European nations erected protective tariffs to protect their sugar-
14. A covariate analysis suggests, however, than the variance explained by entrances into
Cuba is rnuch :ess. An Attempt at calculating a rnultiple linear regression, using nine file va-riables,
disclosed a serious problern of collinearity. Indeed, the highest eta2 value obtained for
Cuban entrances in this exercise was + 0.37. This suggests that in al1 likelihood, Cuban en-trances
explain sornewhere between thirthy-seven and seventy-six percent of annual changes,
which is a considerable rnargin for error. .I >c . &e, Íorexmipk, Paiq aid .%do&, 222-225.
16. Suchlicki, 52-59.
17. Statistics on Cuban sugar production may be found in LeRiverend, Appendix 1.
18. By 1860 Spain, which had once been the principal imponer of Cuban sugar, absorbed
only three percent of al1 exports
beet industries, the United States took over eighty percent of Cuban sugar
productionl9.
Coupled with economic changes were political upheavals. Although
Cuba had been relatively stable in the first half of the century, political un-rest
swept the island after 1868. The Ten Years' War (1868-78) had a
drarnatic effect on the sugar industry, especially in the eastern half of the is-land.
An uneasy peace followed, but the political uncertainty was never re-solved,
culrninating in Jose Martí's revolution of 1895 and American inter-vention
during the Spanish-American War20.
This brief synopsis of the history of Cuba's political economy forms a
necessary backdrop to the comprehension of the pattern of deployment of
Canadian vessels in the Cuban trade (see Figure 2). Entrances by Canadian
vessels into Cuban ports followed a pattern quite similar to the voyage pat-terns
for the region as a whole. From a fairly insignificant base, entrances
rose rapidiy in the iate 1860s, peaked in 1870, were highly variable through
most of the 1870s, and then dwindled after the early 1880s.
How can this pattern be explained? First of all, we must consider the
rapid increase in the volume of exports after 1860 and the shift of markets
from Europe to North America. As Table 5 indicates, an overwhelming per-centage
of Canadian voyagesfrom Cuban ports were destined for North
America, and in each period more than three-quarters of the terminal ports
were in the United States. Havana, with its more diverse range of exports,
was the only entrepot among the seven major Cuban ports to fa11 consist-ently
below the mean in North American trade.
Thus, it is clear that Canadian vessel owners were able to tap the bur-geoning
carrying trade in sugar to North America. But since the vast majo-rity
of this trade was with the United States, how were Canadians able to in-crease
dramatically their participation in this commerce? The answer is fair-ly
simple: Canadian owners grasped the main chance. The U.S. Civil War
weakened the American merchant marine; nationalist restrictions on the
shipping industry completed the crippling p r o c e s~C~a~n.a dians were able
19. This movement is discussed in A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Loughedd, Tbe Gowbt of
tbe Internationdfiononzy, 1820-1960 (London 1971). 67 ff.
20. Our understanding of Cuban political history in this period is derived largely frorn Fo-ner,
125 ff.
21. An excellent overview of the decline of the Arnerican rnerchant rnarine is Jeffrey J. Saf-ford,
<The Dedine of the American Merchant Marine: A Historiographp, in Fischer and Mat-thews
(ed.) , Cbange andAdaptahon in Mantime Hi r t o ~(f orthcoming) .
Number of
Entrances
I
Figure 2
Entrances into Cuban Ports, 1863-1890
1863 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
Year
Source: West lndies Data File.
Table 5
Port
Destinations of Voyages from Cuba, 1863-1890
(% Destinations in North America)
Cuba
Havana
Matanzas
Cardenas
Cienfuegos
Santiago
Sagua la Grande
Caibarien
Note: Passages from one Cuban port to another exctuded.
Source: West lndies Data File.
to step into the trade simply because the possessed inexpensive and avail-able
vessels during a period of burgeoning demand22.
The increase in Canadian participation occurred not only because the
opportunity coincided with the rise of Canadian shipowning but also pre-sumably
because Canadians were able to profit from it. It will be recalled
that by the 1860s Canadian owners were engaged heavily in the crosstrades,
and their renewed interest in Cuba was pan of this larger phenomenon. We
have argued elsewhere that potential profits were not by themselves the sole
determinant of the choice of vessel deployment23. But in the Cuban trade,
it would appear that an understanding of the patterns of freight rates,
which are clearly related to potential profits, is crucial to a comprehension
of Canadian involvement .
A brief digression is perhaps in order. Very early in the life of the At-lantic
Canada Shipping Project we becarne aware of the deficiencies in the
standard freight rate indices for the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-turies.
We were not the first group of historians to make this discovery, to
be sure, but we established a long-term plan to attempt to remedy the pro-blem.
As a result we have been compiling information on freight mes,
principally frorn shipping newspapers and mercantile records24. For this pa-per
the preliminary data set consits principally of quotations derived from
the New York: Mani.ime Register, Mitchell's Mani.ime Register, London
Sh$ping and Mercantile Gazette, London Shipping and Mercantile
Gazette and Uoy81 List, London Shipping World and Herald of Com-rnerce
and Fairplay .
22. As a control on the findings of our Canadian study, we are also completing a One-Per-cent
Sample of al1 voyages made by non-Canadian British Empire vessels. While the file is not
yet complete, preliminary analysis suggests that British owners did not seize the sarne oppor-tunities.
Perhaps this reflecn a greater British commitment to other, more-established trades.
If w: this suggests the possibility that Canadians were able to enter the Cuban trade precisely
because it was marginal. This possibility will be further tested below, and it is aiso hoped that
a more solid explanation will emerge once the One-Percent Sample and ancillary materials are
more fully analyzed.
23. See, for example, Lewis R. Fischer, Eric W. Sager and Rosemary Ommer, «The Shipp-ing
Industry and Regional Economic Development in Atlantic Canada, 1871-1891: Saint John
as a Case S t u d ~i,n Fischer and Sager (eds.), Merchant Shipping a~dEcononicD evelopment,
33-53.
24. Some of this data has been presented in Keith Matthews, aThe Canadian Deep Sea
Merchant Marine and the American Export Trade, 1850-189b, in Alexander and Ommer
(eds.), Volunes hbt Vahes, 195-243.
Table 6
Y ear
Isserlis Freight ate Index
(1869 = 100)
Index Y ear Index
Source: L. Isserlis, ((Tramp Shipping Cargoes and Freightw, in B. R. Mitchell and Phyllis
Deane, Abstract of British Historieal Statistics (Cambridge 1962), 224.
Table 7
Indexed Freight Rate: Havana-New York (sugar)
(1869 = 100)
Y ear Index Y ear Index
Note: Where posible, this reflects sailing vessels only.
Source: See text.
Table 8
Indexed Freigh t Rate: Matanzas- New York (sugar)
(1869 = 100)
Year Index Y ear Index
Note: Where possible, this reflects sailing vessels only; 1884, 1886 and 1887 are interpo-lations
based upon underlying Havan trends.
Source: See text.
Table 9
Indexed Freight Rate: Cienfuegos-New York (sugar)
(1869 = 100)
Y ear Index Year Index
Note: Where posible, this reflects sailing,vessels only.
Source: See text.
Tables 6 through 9 present time series of freight rates for the ports of
Havana, Matanzas and Cienfuegos; as well the standard Isserlis index has
been included for comparison. These series, while still preliminary and sub-ject
to furcher revision, nevertheless show some important points. First of
all, while al1 of the Cuban series follow the general trends of the Isserlis
index. none correlate particularly well with it25. Thus, if despite al1 its de-ficiencies
we accept Isserlis as reflecting general trends in the world freight
markets (which is reasonable), it is clear that the Cuban trades reflect a very
different reality. Further, the Cuban series suggest the existence of at least
two different freight markets. While the Havana and Matanzas rates show a
moderately strong correlation ( + .68), the Cienfuegos series correlates poor- m
ly with either ( + .14 with Matanzas, - .30 with Havana). E
Second, the Cienfuegos rates do not show the extreme fluctuations O n
that might be expected of a port in Las Villas province affected by the Ten =m
O
Years' War. If the prospect of high returns drew Canadians into the trade, EE
there is little evidence that tfiey collected exceptionally high rewards beca- S
E
use of the exigences of war. Futher research into the freight rates of Santia-go
or Caribarien, which suffered greater disruptions, might alter this pic- 3
ture, but at present it would appear that the war played at best a small role e-m
in attracting Canadian vessels. E
But perhaps more important than either of the first two observations is O
one characteristic which was shared by al1 three Cuban ports: by and large n
their freight rates were higher than the Isserlis index through the mid- E a
1870s; thereafter, their declines were far more precipitous than the world
n norm. In Havana, for instance, sugar rates were Iittle better than a fifth n
their 1869 leve1 by 1890; in Matanzas, they were only a quarter as high. 3
This suggests a tentative hypothesis. Canadians, it would seem, were O
well-placed to capitalize upon the opportunities presented in the 1860s.
Not only did the have vessels available but they also enjoyed a geographic
proximity to both supply and market. The higher than average freight rates
i f the 1860s were the clincher. On the other hand. faced with rapidly fall-ing
freights in the 1880s, Canadians shifted their assets out of the Cuban
carrying trade. This hypothesis possesses al1 the beauty -and al1 the dang-
2 5 , TL.-A..A,-:-..~-AC-: L..' ~ " l i L I a L I V ' 1 W L I I I L I L I I L J dlC,
Isserlis - Havana: + .28
Isserlis - Matanzas: - .34
Isserlis - Cienfuegos: + .O9 (to 188 1).
ers- of self-evident simplicity. Yet there is some further supporting evi-dence
to suggest that it is worth pursuing.
For example, we know that the Cuban trade must have been very ex-pensive.
This is demonstrated by at least three facts. First of all, owners and
masters throughout the period had apparenc difficulties securing cargoes.
In the 1860s, seventy-nine percent of al1 voyages required more than one
port or cal1 for loading; this figure rose to eighty-eight percent in the 1870s
and remained close to that leve1 (85%) in the 1880s. As well, the duration
of an average New York-Cuba-New York voyage compared to the much
longer New York-Barbados-New York trip requiera 31 % more time in the
1860s, 37 % longer in the 1870s, and 42% more in the 1880s. Freight rates
may have been high, but delay was expensive and could decimate potential
profits.
Costs rnust have been further escalated by the poor pon facilities. Cu-ba
was not unique in this regard; indeed, inadequate facilities were the
norm rather than the exception in the Caribbean. Still, outside of Havana
costs must have been boosted by the primitive conditions. Matanzas was
described as a port with «only eight feet of water alongside the wharf and no
light at the harbour entrances. As well, masters were warned that since
usailing vessels had difficulties beating their way out», delays were ende-mic26.
Sagua la Grande was cited for the lack of stearn tugs27; vessels enter-ing
Cienfuegos were cautioned that heavy silting and shoals provided spe-cial
dangers28. Similar warnings were issued for most of the principal ports.
As well, even if a vessel surrnounted these difficulties, there was the cons-tant
danger of shipwreck on the dangerous shoals and reefs. Indeed, al-though
the West Indies accounted for les than eleven percent of all voya-gos,
the region clairned forty-six percent of al1 marine disasters. And the Cu-ban
coast accounted for over sixty percent of vessels lost in the Caribbean29.
Finally, expenses were increased by the necessity to carry crews which
were larger than average. This was dictated not onlg by the treacherous con-ditions
which required extra hands to serve as lookouts and to man the sails
but also by the fact that in almost every pon crews were required to work
26. Urquhan, 543.
27. Ibzd., 541.
28. Ibzd, 530.
29. See, for example, David Alexander, «Output and Productivity in the Yarmouth
Ocean Fleet, 1863-1901~i.n Alexander and Ornmer (eds.), Vohmes Not Values, 63-91; see
also notes 9 and 10.
the cargo30. This extra expense must have been particularly onerous for Ca-nadian
owners, who managed to stay in the industry after the late 1870s lar-gely
becouse of an ability to raise productivity while slashing crew31. But, as
Table 10 indicates, West Indian voyages. and Cuban voyages in particular,
required far more men per hundred tons than any other trade route32.
In short, these conditions lend a good deal of support to our tentative
hypothesis. Further research may uncover additional causes to explain the
patterns, but at this point we have reason to believe that we are on the right
path.
Riit if an euan~inatlono f Cuhz is esseatia! te ~laderstandp ~ t e ~efm
Canadian sailing vessels in the 1860s and 1870s, we must look a bit further
to comprehend the 1880s. Cuban ports were less important in this latter de-cade;
instead, other regional ports, become more crucial to Canadian
vessels.
Chief among these were Barbados, St. Thomas and Trinidad. Toge-ther,
these three ports accounted for almost half of al1 regional entrances af-ter
1880. Despite the fact that they al1 produced staple exports, the eviden-ce
is reasonabley clear that it was a very different function which explained
their new significance: these three ports becarne the most important aports
for ordersn in the region. While sailing vessels.had long depended upon
such ports, the squeeze on profits caused by declining freight rates and the
challenge of steam gave added prominence to these harbours. If sailing ves-sels
were to be effectively deployed, the ability.to dispatch them on short
notice to ports which offered cargoes or markets was essential.
30. Urquhart, 519-520.
31. Seenote29.
32. Of course, one would expect West Indian and Cuban voyages to have higher man-ton
ratios given the fact that fairly small vessels were ernployed in the trade. But two facts suggest
that it was still relatively expensive. First of al], the rate of change in man-ton ratios was less on
West Indian voyages than on any other trade route; if this is taken as a rough surrogate for pro-
Yuaiiity g : ~ d i ,k is c!caí :ha: the West :iidiaii í d e i mita wcrr n o g~ro wing in efiiciency as
rapidly as the others. Second, a series of analyses were performed on some of the data holding
tonnage constant. The results indicated that West Indian voyages required a significantly grea-ter
arnount of labour per ton than did vessels on any other trade route.
Route
Tablle 10
Man-Ton Ratios on Selected Trade Routes, 1863-90
Al1 Routes
West Indies
Cuba
North Atlantic
India/ Asia
U. S. Gulf
Australia
South America
Note: Man-ton ratio defined as men per orie hundred tons.
Source: West Indies Date File.
% Change
Al1 three ports were admirably located for this task. The respective har-bours
were large, well-sheltered and well-provisioned. As well, with the
growing irnportance of the South American trades, the three ports were
centrally-located to serve conveniently as ports for orders.
St Thomas, in the Danish West Indies, had long been an important
port for orders. Indeed, through the 1870s it was by far the most important
su& harbour in the Caribbean. The reasons for this are not difficult to fat-hom.
A free pon after 1775, by the middle of the nineteenth century St.
Thomas «had become an international centre of commerce, (where) mer-chant
vessels from Europe vied for anchoraged3. Ship repair and brokerage
facilities were constructed, and the port openly advertised itself as a pon for ,,
orders34. Given its location, it was a natural pon in which to cal1 on voyages E
from Europe to the New World; by the 1880s it was also a logical way-sta- O
rion on riie rradc roures ~onrirrririgX ortii and Sourii Anierica. n -
=m
O Trinidad, and particularly the principal pon of Port of Spain, develop- EE
ed a similar reputation. As the closest island to the coast of South America, S
E
Trinidad was a natural pon of cal1 for vessels which had spent two months
beating along the coast from Buenos Aires. Orders for masters could be te- =
legraphed by distant owners to agents in the pon, directing them to make e-for
a wide range of destinations. Again, local businessmen grasped the op- m
E
portunity, and Trinidad's improved port facilities attracted a wide-range of O
Canadian sailing vessels3s. ,,
But perhaps the most irnpressive sucess story was Bridgetown, Barba-dos.
As the most easterly of the Caribbean islands, Barbados was the first
landfall for vessels sailing to the area from Europe. Canadian sailing vessels
had transported cargoes form the island in the 1860s and 1870s, but by the
1880s the principal reason for entering the port was for orders. Indeed, by
1888 the editor of one respected shipping manual could proclaim that
Bridgetown had become «the principal chanering centre of the West Ind-ies.
leiegraphic communications, as in St. ihomas anci Trinidad, provici-ed
information about markets36.
The increased interest in these ports is undeniable, but since the crew
lists provide no information on cargoes, is it possible to ascertain with any
33. Urquhart, 279-280.
34. Holbcook, 37-39.
35. ,Urquhart, 1229-1233.
36: Ibid.. 1221-1222.
Table 11
Port Times in Selected Caribbean Ports, 1863-90
(Mean Days)
Port 1863-69 1870-79 1880-90
Ports for Orders
St. Thomas 3.2 2.9 2.2
Port of Spain 11.4 7.3 2.8
Rridgetown 19.3 11.0 2.7
Other Regional Ports
Havana 26.3 24.8 24.1
Kingston 29.1 28.4 27.6
Matanzas 31.7 30.0 29.4
Martinique 27.1 23.6 22.8
Note: Man-ton ratio defined as men per one hundred tons.
Source: For West Indies, West Indies Data File. For others, Fischer,
«The Grat Mudhole Fleet)), Table 18.
confidente that Canadian vessels used these pons for orders rather than
cargoes? The answer to this query is yes. Table 11 presents information on
the amount of time spent in each port over time. From the table it can be
clearly seen that by the 1880s the time spent in each pon was simply too
short to permit the loading of cargo, particularly when their port times are
compared with those for other regional ports.
Another piece of evidence supporting the conclusion that these three
ports were performing a communications function is presented in Table 12. ,
It will be recalled from Table 5 that vessels departing Cuban ports were
highly-concentrated in the export trades to the United States. Similar
ustreaming pattems may be observed for other staple-exporting ports in
the region. But Bridgetown, St. Thomas and Port of Spain were different.
Al1 showed a far w. ide.r range of destinations than did the Cuban ports, es- ..11,:,,- p ~ l a l l y+ LA ,, ., ,,,,,-,..,., ,E1:.1., -.LL C-..cL A---:-- :- L ~ I C~ I W W I I I 1~ l l l y w l L a l l u WL llllh3 W ~ L U~ J U L I ~I U ~ L L La~uuC ~~ I L 1J1 1
the Gulf of Mexico. This dispersion provides further support for the view
that these ports were functionally different than those elsewhere. And since
the evidence is strong that these ports were the sgrowth poles for Canadian
shipping in the West Indies during the 1880s, it is hard to avoid the conclu-sion
that for Canadian vessels at leas, by the 1880s the West Indian trade
had been reduced to using the islands merely as stopping points on longer
voyages.
Table 12
Destinations for Vessels Departing Ports for Orders, 1863-90
(Percentages)
Port for Orders
St. Thomas
1863-69
1870-79
1880-89
Port of Spain
1863-69
1870-79
1880-89
Bridgetown
1863-69
1870-79
1880-89
USA,
Gulf'
6.3910
7.1910
15.8%
7.9910
8.596
23.396
20.0%
15.6%
25.0$%
Destinations
South
America
7.9%
11.4%
20.4%
18.4%
25.0%
45.0%
15.0%
25.8%
39.4%
Europe
3 1.2%
33.0%
23.4%
33.3%
25.0%
10.0%
20.0%
17.4%
2.2%
West
lndies
12.0%
9.3%
10.4%
13.1%
10.0%
5.0%
5.0%
18.8%
10.1%
Other
8.6%
6.5%
5.7%
5.6%
6.5%
0.1%
10.0%
8.5%
7.0%
Source: West Indies Data File.
This paper has been both a preliminary and necessarily speculative
attempt to describe and to explain the patterns of Canadian involvement in
West Indian shipping. Doubtless it has raised at leas as many questions as
it has provided answers. While this may appear frustrating, in our view it is
a necessary stage in the long-term process of under-standing historicaf phe-nomena.
The question of the provision of transport services in the nineteenth
century Caribbean has been but little explored. Given the irnportance plac-ed
by expon-based economies upon transportation, this lacunae in our his-torical
knowledge seems unacceptable. While we believe that we have shed
light on some of the important historical problems in this area, we would
consider this paper a success if it motivated even one scholar to enquire fur-ther
into the issues. We would hope that someone will soon accpet this
challenge.
This paper is an extension of work carried out by membes of the Atlantic Canada Shipp-ing
Project at Memorial University of Newfoundland. The authors would like to thank their
coiieagues in Chis project. especially Eric Sager, Keith Matdiews and the late David Alexander
for thir contributions to this collaborative research effon. The work of the Atlantic Canada
Shipping Projcct has been funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada and Memorial University; we gratehily acknowledge this support.